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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WYCOFF COMPANY, INCORPORATED
Plaintiff,
vs.

Cases No.
7409 and 7410

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH AND ROY HILL djb/a
SEMIONS TRUCK LINE
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF THE CASES
These matters are before the Supreme Court on
writs of review from the Public Service Commission of
Utah for the purpose of reviewing three reports 1and
orders of the Commission issued under the date of
August 8, 1949, following a consolidated hearing of the
Commission's Cases No. 3273, No. 3409 and No. 3413,
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held at Salt Lake City, Utah on June 29, 1949. Case
No. 3273 involved the application of Roy Hill dba Seamons Truck Line (the defendant) for a certificate of
convenience and necessity as a common motor carrier
of property over regular routes. Cases No. 3409 and
3413 dealt with the applications of Wycoff Company,
Incorporated (the plaintiff), (1) for a permit to operate
as 1a contract motor carrier of property, and (2) for
a certificate of convenience and necessity as a common
motor carrier of property over regular routes respeCtively. The applicants applied only for intrastate rights
principally to transport motion picture film, theater
supplies and accessories, and newspapers to points north
of Salt Lake City.
The Commission granted the application of the
defendant, Hill, and denied both applications of the
plaintiff, Wycoff Company, Incorporated. A petition
for rehearing was filed in each case on August 13, 1949.
Two of them were denied September 20, 1949 and the
third, which involved the plaintiff's application for
common motor carrier authority, was denied October 13,
1949. The petitions for rehearing were all filed by this
plaintiff and alleged as error all matters which are
before this Court for review.
Case No. 7409 now before the Supreme Court deals
with the contract motor carrier application (the Commission's Case No. 3409), and the record of this case is
hereinafter referred to as '' R' '. Supreme Court No.
7410 contains two volumes of record and involves the
two common motor carrier applications, first of defend-
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3
ant (the Commission's Case No. 3273, which record
hereinafter referred to as '"Rec. II."), and second, of
plaintiff, "~ycoff Company, Incorporated (the Commission's Case No. 3413, which record is hereinafter designated as "Rec. I.").
The general issues before this Court are the following: (1) whether the Commission regularly pursued
its authority; (2) whether there was substantial evidence
to support the reports and orders of the Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 4, 1939 the Public Service Commission
granted Northwestern Express, Inc. Contract Motor
Carrier Permit No. 241 in Case No. 2308 which authorized hauling of motion picture film and related materials
from Salt Lake City to the two theaters at Tremonton
and the one at Garland (both in Utah), ·and return. The
three contractees under this permit were Orpheum
Theater of Tremonton (C. J. Shultz), Liberty Theater
also of Tremonton (B. F. Winzler), and Garland
Theater at Garland (G. R. Lawrence).
Northwestern Express, Inc., a Utah corporation has
had continuous corporate existence since 1939. By the
sole amendment to its articles of incorporation, the
name of the corporation was changed to Wycoff Company, Incorporated in December, 1947 (Rec. I, 159), and
the change of name was the only purpose of the amendment.
This Contract Motor Oarrier Permit No. 241 (as
well as its Utah Interstate Carrier Permit No. 146)
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was ordered suspended on January 27, 1944 by the Commission due to difficulties incident to wartime regulations of the Office of Defense Transportation (Rec. I,
120).
The present principal stockholder of Wycoff Company, Incorporated, purchased the ()Utstanding stock
of Northwestern Express, Inc. in March, 1947 when all
of its operating rights referred to were under the suspension order. In April, 1947, Northwestern Express,
Inc. petitioned the Commission to reinstate its operating authority, and on April 24, 1947 the Commission
ordered the previous suspension order cancelled and
reinstated the operating rights under Permit No. 241
and Interstate Carrier Permit No. 146. (The latter
authorized common carrier service in interstate commerce between Salt Lake City and the Utah-Idaho state
line.) The order reinstating Permit No. 241 read, in
part, as follows:
''The Northwestern Express is hereby authorized to operate upon and over the highways of
the State of Utah in intrastate commerce over
the same routes and under the same restrictions
as specified in the Commission's Report and
Order dated October 4, 1939." (Rec. I, 163).
The caption of the reinstatement order in the Commission's Case No. 2308 contained the individual names of
the three contractees, but the body of the order made
no reference to the individual contractees who signed
the contracts under the permit for the three theaters.
Pursuant to the reinstatement order, the North-
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western Express, Inc. secured a new contract with the
Orpheum Theater of Tremonton which was signed by
D. "\Y. Harris, its new manager. This contract was dated
April 7, 1947 and was filed with the Commission May
16, 1947. (Rec. I, 119).
On ~larch 21, 1947, the defendant Hill had made
application to the Commission to serve the Orpheum
and Liberty Theaters at Tremonton, and the hearing
on the application was conducted April 16, 1947. No
other contract carrier had been granted a contract motor
carrier permit to serve these theaters since the Suspension Order of January 27, 1944. The defendant Hill
did secure temporary emergency permits to serve the
two theaters pending its hearing, the first having been
obtained March 24, 1947 (Rec. I, 76). The principal stockholder of the plaintiff, Wycoff Company, Incorporated,
formerly known as Northwestern Express, Inc. testified
that he had no personal knowledge of the hearing on
defendant Hill's ,application held April 16, 1947, and
none was directed to the corporation. (Rec. I, 121). By
its report and order dated July 9, 1947, the Commission
authorized defendant Hill to serve the Orpheum Theater
of Tremonton (D. W. Harris), and the Liberty Theater
of Tremonton (Dorian Toland). The same theater buildings were involved and the identical commodities were
to be transported over the s~ame highways, but the
theaters had changed ownership since Permit No. 241
was first issued in 1939 to the plaintiff, but this change
had occurred prior to the reinstatement of Permit No.
241.
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The defendant Hill made further application to the
Commission to serve the only theater at Garland, now
called the M~ain instead of the Garland Theater, and was
also under different ownership from the individuals
who signed the contracts filed under plaintiff's Permit
No. 241. Again the plaintiff company was not given
notice of the hearing. The Commission's Report and
Order of January 9, 1948 authorized service by the defendant Hill to the Main Theater of Garland (Reed D.
Wood).
All of the operating rights of defendant Hill, prior
to the Commission's Report and Order of August 8,
1949 (one of the orders now before this Court for review), were held in the name of Melva H. Seamons.
She received Contract Carrier Permit No. 266 by the
Commission's Order of January 31, 1941, by which
order the rights of her former husband, Ray T. Seamons,
were transferred to her and his Contract Carrier Permit No. 29 was cancelled. On April 15, 1947 the Commission approved a lease arrangement between Melva
H. Seamons, lessor, and Roy Hill, lessee, wherein the
contract carrier rights of the lessor in Utah, Idaho and
interstate commerce, were leased to the lessee. This
lease was for five years' duration, subject to termination on 30 days' advance written notice (Rec. I, 88), and
was to expire February 1, 1951. (Rec. I, 82). No mention is made therein of any rights other than those as
a contract motor carrier. All contracts then existing,
or future, were to be made by mutual agreement of the
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lessor and lessee, ·and were to be in the name of the
lessor (~Irs. Seamons) only.
On ~lay 21, 1948 the defendant Hill made application in his own name for common motor carrier authority
from Salt Lake City to .Lewiston and Garland, serving
all the theaters covered by the Utah contract carrier
permit that was leased from Melva H. Seamons, including various off-route points. (Rec. II, 1). By this application the defendant sought to change his operation as
lessee of Contract ~Iotor Carrier Permit No. 266 to
common motor carrier authority. The plaintiff, Wycoff
Company, Incorporated was a protestant at the hearing
held June 29, 1949 before the Commission, which also
heard two applications of the plaintiff. All three applications were consolidated for purposes of the hearing
by express consent of all concerned (Rec. I, 35).
On August 8, 1949 the Commission issued its report
and order concerning the defendant's application and
thereby granted the defendant Hill, in his own right,
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 874 ( Rec.
II, 14 to 18) which enlarged his operating rights to the
same territory he formerly operated only as a lessee
of Contract Motor Carrier Permit No. 266, issued to
Melva H. Seamons, which was cancelled by the order.
The report and order of the Commission makes no
reference to Melva H. Seamons or the lease arrangement under which defendant Hill operated.
Wycoff Company, Incorporated filed its application
for a permit to operate as a contract motor carrier to
serve the Orpheum Theater at Tremonton and the Main
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Theater ~at Garland on May 25, 1949 (R. 1 to 3). These
two theaters were under the management of Allied
Theatres Company. This application was filed only
after the Commission advised the plaintiff, Wycoff
Company, Incorporated that it had no authority to
serve any the,aters in either Tremonton or Garland, and
that any service rendered to that area would be in
violation of the Commission's orders. A contract had
been secured by the Wycoff Company, Incorporated with
Allied Theatres Company, operators of Orpheum
Theater ~at Tremonton and the Main Theater at Garland
(Hugo Jorgenson) which was dated May 1, 1949 and
was filed May 6, 1949 (R. 14, 15). A contract dated
June 24, 1949 (five days b~fore the hearing) between
defendant Hill and the Orpheum Theater at Tremonton
and Main Theater ~at Garland (Allied Theatres Company, by Hugo Jorgenson) was brought into the hearing but was never approved by the Commission, nor
was an application for authority in addition to the contract itself filed by defendant Hill (Rec. I, 51, 52; 165).
On June 13, 1949, Wycoff Company, Incorporated
made application for authority to serve as a common
motor carrier over regular routes from Salt Lake City to
the Utah-Idaho line over U.S. Highways 91 and 89, serving the off-route points of Lewiston and Hyrum (Rec. I,
1). Thi:s application did not duplicate the area to be served
by the plaintiff's contract motor carrier application.
Since the reinstatement of Northwestern Express,
Inc.'s interstate operating rights in 1947 and subsequent
additions thereto, that corporation has operated daily
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schedules, seYen days a week over the highways in
Utah through the areas involved by its applications,
transporting the identical commodities to points in Idaho
under authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Public Utilities Commission of Idaho.
Common motor carrier authority was also held in the
plaintiff company's name from the Utah Commission to
transport ice cream and newspapers in intrastate commerce over these same highways and through Tremonton
and Garland (Rec. I, 140-1). For this reason there
can be no question that the highways over which the
Wycoff Company, Incorporated desires to operate are
not unduly burdened and that the granting of the application will not unduly interfere with the traveling public.
Wycoff Company, Incorporated operates five daily
schedules going north, four of which are bound for
points in Idaho, leaving Salt Lake City as follows:
1. Leaves at 12 :15 o'clock A.M. via Tremonton

to Burley, Idaho;
2. Leaves at 11:30 o'clock A.M. via Tremonton
and Pocatello to St. Anthony, Idaho;
3. Leaves at 1:30 o'clock P.M. via Brigham City
and Logan, Utah to Preston, Idaho;
4. Leaves at about midnight via Tremonton and
Pocatello to St. Anthony, Idaho;
5. Leaves at 2:30 o'clock P.M. to Ogden, Utah.
(Rec. I, 111).
Defendant Hill operates one schedule daily of two
trucks going north from Salt Lake City, both leaving at
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approximately 2:00 o'clock A.M. (Rec. I, 74).
Insofar as it could be considered pertinent to a
need for a change of service from a contract carrier to
a common carrier by defendant Hill, the following evidence or lack of evidence is pointed out:
Only one public witness appeared in the proceedings, and he appeared to support the applications of
plaintiff, Wycoff Company, Incorporated to serve the
Tremonton-Garland area, and to serve as a carrier in
emergencies when the defendant Hill could not provide
the needed service due to his limited one-schedule-a-day
operation.
(Testimony of defendant Hill, on cross-examination):

"Q. Now, what is the need of a common
carrier authority up there (in the are;;t covered
by your application)~
''A. Oh, you don't have to bother with these
contracts. It keeps somebody else from coming
in without your being called into a hearing, j-qst
a hearing without us knowing anything about it.
That is about all.
'' Q. _Is there any need for the public, so far
as they are concerned, for a common carrier
authority~

''A. No. I wouldn't say that there was.
''COMMISSIONER HACKING: Well, the
fact of the business is, according to his evidence,
all the public is using his contracts.
"MR. HANSON (Attorney for Hill): In fact,
he is a common carrier now, but he doesn't have
the rights." (Rec. I, 70, 71)
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Mr. McMahon, the public witness, is manager of
Republic Pictures in Salt Lake City, which is one of the
dozen film distributing companies which serve the
theaters in Utah, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming and Nevada.
He testified on behalf of plaintiff that all of the other
film distributing companies operate on 'Substantially the
same basis as his company, and that he had worked for
three of them. His testimony was that there was no
speedy service readily available to Tremonton and Garland (Rec. I, 131), and to Logan (Rec. I, 125) except
by the defendant Hill who operated only once :each day.
He stated that no other carrier is authorized by the
Commission to render the personalized, specialized,
speedy -service the industry requires into that area. (Rec.
I, 126; 131 ; also see 167).
(Testimony of Mr. McMahon, direct examination):

'' Q. Are you here to support the application
of Wycoff Company~
''A. Yes sir.
"Q. And do you feel that an additional carrier is to the advantage of the industry~
''A. I do, because I have explained before
it is necessary to get the (motion picture) print
there.
'' Q. Have you used the services of Wycoff
in the state otherwise
''A. Yes. We used him when he started down
to Price and Helper.
"Q. Is this 'Service now satisfactory
"A. Very satisfactory. I believe every ex-
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change manager and booker will say it is satisfactory." (Rec. I, 131, 132)

'' Q. Now, will you state whether or not one
service a day leaving Salt Lake at approximately
2 :00 A.M. is adequate for your business~
''A. Well, it depends - I mean, emergencies
come up, and that is something we can't foresee.
'' Q. Do you need an extra service to take
care of these emergencies~
''A. I think something adequate should be
set up for that. * * * '' (Rec. I, 127)

The Court should be advised that there is not a
single word from a public witness showing any need
for a change from contract earrier to common carrier
service. There is not even any evidence from the defendant-applicant Hill himself showing any necessity
for common carrier service. The evidence is undisputed
that the theaters in the communities of Tremonton and
Garland desire to be served by a contract carrier, and
no evidence of ~any kind was presented to show the need
for the defendant to change his type of service. The
defendant Hill himself even had the owner of theaters
in these communities sign on a contract to obtain contract carrier service five days before the date of the
hearing.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
A.

Plaintiff's ·Contract Motor Carrier Application
1. The Commission did not regularly pursue its
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:mthority but acted contrary to statute by denying the
plaintiff pern1ission to serve the two theaters involved.
2. The Commission did not regularly pursue its
!l.uthority but acted arbitrarily or capriciously by denyrng the plaintiff permission to serve the two theaters
involved.
3. The Commission did not regularly pursue its
authority but acted contrary to its own rules and regulations by denying the plaintiff permission to serve the
two theaters involved.
B. Defendant's Common Motor Carrier Application

4. The Commission did not regularly pursue its
authority but acted without statutory authority in granting unlimited common carrier rights to the lessee of a
contract carrier permit.

5. There is no competent evidence to sustain the
finding that public convenience and necessity require
that the defendant's truck line be authorized to operate
as a common motor carrier.
C.

Plaintiff's Common Motor Carri·er Application

6. The finding of the Commission that public convenience and necessity does not require the service proposed to be rendered by the plaintiff is not supported
by substantial evidence.
7. The findings of the Commission that there is
already sufficient service available and that the granting
of a certificate to plaintiff would be detrimental to
existing transportation service ·and contrary to the best
interests of the people in the area, are not supported
by substantial evidence.
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ARGUMENT
A.

Plaintiff's Contract Motor Carrier Application

THE COMMISSION DID NOT REGULARLY
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY BUT ACTED CONTRARY TO STATUTE BY DENYING THE PLAINTIFF PERMISSION TO SERVE THE TWO THEATERS INVOLVED.
The plaintiff, Wycoff Company, Incorporated, -contends that after the Commission granted it a statutory
contract motor carrier permit which has never been
revoked, or cancelled, that the benefits contemplated by
the legislature under the permit were withheld by the
Commission.
The legislature has never defined the term "contract motor carrier permit'' although it is used several
times in Title 76, Chapter 5, U.C.A. 1943 as amended.
It is clear that it shall be unlawful for any contract
carrier to operate in either interstate or intrastate commerce witho-q.t having first obtained this "permit" after
proper application has been made and certain facts
determined. (76-5-21, 76-5-22, U.C.A. 1943, as amended).
It is also ~apparent that the Commission is given certain
powers to "suspend, alter, amend or revoke any * * *
permit * * * issued" (76-5-33, U.C.A. 1943).
Without question a "permit" is a thing of value,
for under 76-5-40, U.C.A. 1943, the legislature provided
that upon the death of a holder it "shall be transferable the same as any other right or interest of the person's estate,'' subject to enumerated conditions.
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The Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, as amended,
is more specific than the Utah enactn1ent in specifying
the nature of a contract motor carrier permit and the
rights it confers :
''The (Interstate Commerce) Commission
shall specify in the permit the business of the
contract carrier covered thereby and the scope
thereof and shall attach thereafter, such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations consistent
·with the character of the holder as a contract
carrier as are necessary to carry out, with re- .
spect to the operations of such carrier, the requirements established by the Commission * * *:
Provided, h01cever, That no terms, conditions, or
limitations shall restrict the right of the carrier
to substitute or add contracts within the scope of
the permit, as the development of the business
and the demands of the public may require.'' (49
u.s.c. 309 (b)).

It is apparent that the federal statute clearly states
that the Interstate Commerce Commission shall not restrict the freedom to contract of the holder of a permit
by limiting to a specific shipper the authority granted
under said permit.
The plaintiff contends that the Utah Motor Carrier
Act, grants to the holder of a "permit", by implication,
some of the same rights clearly specified in detail under
the federal act. One of these rights is for the holder of
a "permit" to serve the new management of any of
the industries authorized to be served by its ''permit''
when there is no other change in the transportation service - i.e., when the same commodities are to be shipped
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over the same highways between the same points of
origin ~and destination, but instead of going to, say, the
Orpheum Theater at Tremonton, with C. J. Shultz as
manager or owner, they are directed to the same Orpheum Theater at Tremonton with D. W. Harris or
Allied Theatres Company as owner. (See statement of
facts).
The Commission, by its actions, has taken the position that nothing was reinstated by its Reinstatement
Order of April 24, 1947, which reactivated Plaintiff's
Contract Motor Carrier Permit No. 241. It has never
permitted the plaintiff to serve anyone under this permit although Wycoff Company, Incorporated, (formerly
named Northwestern Express, Inc.) has secured several
contracts with the part,ies who currently managed or
owned the theaters which were covered by the original
contracts filed in 1939 under Permit No. 241. These
new contracts covered the identical commodities to be
shipped over the same highways and routes, with the
same physical, geographic location (i.e., the same theater
buildings) for a destination, and were signed by the
theater management currently in existence ~after Permit
No. 241 was reinstated.
The Commission has taken the position that the
parties who signed the original contracts in 1939 under
Permit No. 241 were the only parties authorized to be
served thereunder, and that in order for the plaintiff
to serve the new owners it would have to proceed as in
the first inst,ance for a new permit with a complete new
hearing of evidence.
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It should be borne in mind that Permit No. 241 was
not reinstated without knowledge that the management
of these theaters had changed. Still the Commission
recognized its duty to reinstate the plaintiff's permit,
but after the reinstatement rendered it valueless by
limiting its use to individuals who no longer existed.
Contract Motor Carrier Permit No. 241 has never
been revoked by the Commission and the plaintiff has
tried every method it knows to utilize it without violating instructions from the Commission, and now Wycoff
Company, Incorporated, asks this Court to determine
what its rights are under it. The plaintiff contends that
the ''permit'' referred to in the statute is broader than
the persons named as contractees (i.e., the particular
manager or owner of a business - here, theaters).
This is because the power of the Commission does not
include the power to regulate a contract carrier to this
degree. The interest of the public, for whom the Commission acts in regulating contract carriers, is not to
control with whom they may contract but to guard
against ''unduly burdening'' the highways; to see that
there is not "undue interference" with the traveling
public, and to protect the best interests of the general
public in the state ~as a whole, and in the local communities to be served (76-5-21, U.C.A. 1943, as amended by
the laws of Utah, 1943, Chap. 105.) (Also compare the
nature of the findings the Commission is to make as
conditions precedent to granting an interstate "permit"
and a tempor.ary ''permit'' which are similar to those
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required for an intrastate "permit" - 76-5-22 and
76-5-23.)
In determining the nature of a ''permit'', it is to
be remembered that the legislature has drawn a distinction between the amount of regulation to which a
contract motor carrier, which operates under a "permit," and a common carrier, which must secure a certificate of convenience and necessity, are to be subjected.
Mr. Justice Wolfe, in McCarthy v. Public Service Commission, (Utah Supreme Court, August 25, 1947), 184
P. 2d 220, 227, treats this matter very clearly:
''Although the legislature gave the commission power to control contract motor carriers it
did not require the commission to exercise the
close control over contract carriers as it must
exercise over common carriers. For example, as
to common motor carriers the commission 'is
vested with power and authority, and it shall be
its duty, to supervise and regulate all common
motor carriers and fix, alter, regulate and determine just, fair, reasonable and sufficient rates,
fares, charges, etc.' (Italics added) Sec. 76-5-17.
''However, as to contract motor carriers,
while they must obtain a permit, the legislature
said: 'The commission is hereby vested with
power and authority and it may supervise and
regulate every contract motor carrier in this
state and fix and approve reasonable maximum
or minimum rates, fares, charges and classifications, and to adopt reasonable rules and regulations pertaining to all such motor carriers'
(Italics added) Sec. 76-5-24, U.C.A., 1943."
(Italics by the Court)
The opinion continues by pointing out that this discre-
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tionary power of the Commission exists to regulate
contract motor carrier~ -

'· * * to ~practically the same extrnt as is authorized for common motor carriers - provided
the commission determines that such close control is reasonably required. However, merely because the power and authority to regulate contract n1otor carriers is given, that power and
authority need not be exercised unless required
for the benefit of the public and then only to the
extent required" (Ibid, 227).
The plaintiff knows of no determination having
been made in this case why such regulation is required
for the benefit of the public, and states that this Court
has held the Commission does not have power to change
a contract carrier into a common carrier even when
the contract carrier makes application for the change
without substantial evidence to show a public need for
the change (McCarthy v. Public Service Commission,
184 P. 2d 220; also see Point V of this brief, infra.)
The most appare~t distinction between the rights
conferred upon a common motor carrier under a certificate of convenience and necessity and a contract motor
carrier under a permit is this : in the former the public
chooses the carrier, while in contract carrier sevice, the
carrier reserves the right to choose whom of the public
it will serve. The statutory definitions are as follows
(76-5-13, U.C.A. 1943):
'' 'Common Motor Carrier of Property' means
any person who holds himself out to the public
as willing to undertake for hire to transport by
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motor vehicle from place to place, the property
of others who. may choose to employ him.

* * *
" 'Contract Motor Carrier of Property' means
any person engaged in the transportation by
motor vehicle of property for hire and not included in the term common motor carrier of
property as hereinbefore defined.''
The plaintiff had the right under its statutory permit to choose to serve the new owners of the theatres
involved. By denying plaintiff this right the Commission did not recognize the statutory rights it bestowed
upon the plaintiff under Permit No. 241.
Even if the Commission could conceivably be said
to have had power to rule that plaintiff could not serve
the new theatre owners from whom it secured valid contracts, such power must be used, in the language of
76-5-24, U.C.A. 1943, "to adopt reasonable rules and
regulations pertaining to ,all such motor carriers.'' In
this event the statute was still violated in that it was
not reasonable to reinstate Permit No. 241 to the plaintiff and then arbitrarily withhold any possible benefits·
it might afford.
II.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT REGULARLY
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY BUT ACTED ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUSLY BY DENYING THE
PLAINTIFF PERMISSION TO SERVE THE TWO
THEATRES INVOLVED.
If the actions of the Commission which are described
immediately above under ''Point I'' of this brief are
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not in violation of existing statutes, it is contended
that such actions at least were arbitrary or capricious.
The issuance of an order which reinstated the plaintiff's suspended Permit No. 241 followed by refusal of
the Commission to allow the plaintiff to utilize the
permit in any manner, was arbitrary or capricious.
If the Commission intended to deprive the plaintiff of
Permit No. :2-!1 it could have done so in accordance with
76-5-33, U.C.A. 1943 which sets down the procedure for
such action :
"The Commission may at any time for good
cause, and after notice and hearing, suspend,
alter, amend or revoke any certificate, permit or
license issued by it hereunder."
There are other instances of arbitrary or capricious
action.
Mter the plaintiff's Permit No. 241 was reinstated
in April, 1947, the Commission indicated that no operating rights were conferred upon the plaintiff Wycoff
Company, Incorporated (formerly known as Northwestern Express, Inc.) because the contracts filed under
the permit were signed by owners who no longer operated the three theaters in Tremonton and Garland.
However, some of the findings of the Commission regarding the application of the defendant Hill which is
before the Court read as follows:
"That for some time past, applicant (Hill)
has been operating under contract carrier permit
No. 266 and all supplements thereto, transporting motion picture films, theatre accessories,
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magazines and periodicals, from Salt Lake City
to Lewiston ·and Garland, Utah over U. S. 91,
Utah 101, Utah 163, Utah 61, U.S. 191 and U.S.
30-S serving the theatres of the various towns
enroute from Salt Lake City to Lewiston and
Garland, Utah.
''That the Seamons Truck Line has been conducting continuous and satisfactory service as
a contract carrier under the jurisdiction of this
Commission, for the past 10 or 12 years. (Italics
ours.) (Rec. II., 15).
There is only one theatre in Garland, and the Commission, by its report and subsequent order which
granted defendant Hill's application, recognized either
the contract of the defendant with the old management
of the Main Theater at Garland (Reed D. Wood) at a
time when its ownership had changed to Allied Theatres
Company, a corporation, or it recognized the new contract secured by the defendant only five days before the
hearing of defendant Hill's application for common
motor carrier rights, which contract was not covered
by the defendant's permit any more than was plaintiff's
contract (according to the contention of the Commission), with the new mai,tagement of the Orpheum Theater of Tremonton (D. W. Harris) which was filed within
one month of the Reinstatement Order of April 24,
1947. Nor was the latter contract of the defendant before the Commission on a Contract Motor Carrier application.
The Commission does not regularly pursue its authority when it treats one earrier in one manner, and
another in contrary fashion when the fact situations
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are the same. It apparently recognized that the defendant Hill's operation under a contract with a non-owner
was not illegal but refused the plaintiff the right to
conduct such an operation.

III.
THE CO:Jl~liSSIO~ DID NOT REGULARLY
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY BUT ACTED CONTRARY TO ITS 0\YX RULES AND REGULATIONS
BY DENYING THE PLAINTIFF PERMISSION TO
SERVE THE T\YO THEATRES INVOLVED.
Rule :No. VII of the Commission's Motor Carrier
Rules and Regulations No. 3, (effective since June 1,
1937) states the only promulgated regulations regarding
filing of contracts by contract carriers of property:
''Each contract carrier of property by motor
vehicle subject to the Act, namely,
"1. Carriers of general commodities * • •
'' 4. Carriers of moving picture films, accessories and theatre s_upplies ;
"5. * * *
shall on or before July 1, 1937, file
with the Commission one copy of each and every
contract existing and in force on said date * * *,
and that the contracts so filed by any such contract carrier shall be in lieu of any schedule or
schedules theretofore filed by such contract carrier, and the filing of such contracts shall cancel
any such schedule or schedules.
"A copy of each and every contract of any
such contract carrier, entered into or effective
on or after July 1, 1937, shall be filed with the
Commission in the same manner as required in
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relation to existing contracts in the form and
manner prescribed in Tariff Rule VI (which
deals with filing Common Oarrier Freight Tariffs) * * * so far as the provisions of said Rule
is applicable.

"* * ...

"Contracts filed on or before July 1, 1937
shall become effective when filed with the Commission: contracts reducing charges specified in
prior contracts and filed subsequent to July 1,
1937, shall provide thirty days' notice of their
effective date unless otherwise authorized by the
Commission ; and contracts renewing or establishing increases in charges specified in prior contracts, or establishing charges for new services,
may become effective when filed." (Italics ours).
Every contract secured by the plaintiff after Contract Carrier Permit No. 241 was reinstated by the
Commission was filed in the manner contemplated by
the above. These regulations were in effect at all times
mentioned herein. There is nothing contained therein
that would require the plaintiff to make application for
authority to serve new management of theaters it was
already authorized to serve.
B. Defendant's Common Motor ~arrier Application

IV.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT REGULARLY
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY BUT ACTED WITHOUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN GRANTING
UNLIMITED COMMON CARRIER RIGHTS TO THE
LESSEE OF A CONTRACT CARRIER PERMIT.
The defendant Hill leased Contract Carrier Permit
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No. 266 and other contract carrier rights in interstate
commerce from ~Ielva H. Seamons on February 1, 1946.
The lease was to expire in five years (Rec. I, 82), and
as to intrastate rig·hts was approved by the Commission on April15, 1947.
It is the contention of the plaintiff, Wycoff Company, Incorporated, that the Commission is a creature
created by statute with limited powers. Nowhere has
the Commission been granted the power to permit a
lessee of contract carrier rights to make application in
his own name for a certificate of convenience and ne,..
cessity as a common carrier, using as a basis his operations only as a lessee, and in violation of the terms
of the lease on file with the Commission.
A common carrier differs from a contract carrier
in that it is a public utility, while a contract carrier is
not. (76-5-15 U.C.A. 1943.) Hence the public, for whose
protection the Commission was created, has a greater
need to be protected when common carrier rights are
granted than when contract carrier rights are granted.
The much greater responsibility, then, rests upon the
common carrier.
There is much testimony which reflects confusion
in the minds of the Commission, the lessee and the lessor.
There are statements by them that the certificate, if
granted, should issue in the name of the lessor; that
the rights were to be granted to the lessor and to be
operated by the lessee; that the lease covered the ( unmentioned) common carrier rights as well as the contract carrier rights; that the lessee's interest in the
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common carrier's rights, if granted, would pass to the
lessor at the expiration of the lease on F·ebruary 1,
1951. The order of the Commission gives the defendant
Hill unlimited common carrier rights and makes no
mention of the lease or of the lessor, Mrs. Seamons. It
is to be remembered that the lease was terminable at
will on thirty days' notice by the parties thereto.
The plaintiff cannot find any authority or precedent
for the lessee of a contract carrier rights to make ap.
plication for common carrier rights in his own right
soleiy on the basis of his services as a lessee of those
rights, particularly when the terms of the lease ap~
prov.ed by the regulatory body forbid any rights be
obtained except in the name of the lessor.
It is true that Mrs. Seamons, the lessor, was present at the hearing and appeared in behalf of the defendant Hill; but her final statement on cross examination was that she wished the rights to be granted in her
name, as follows :
'' Q. May I ask her again whether or not it
is her intention in appearing here that the rights
be issued in her name,
MR. HANSON (Attorney for defendant
Hill):
Well, now, that question ...
"COMMISSIONER HACKING: She may
answer "yes" or "no".
"A. Yes." (Rec. I., 110).
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v.
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN THE FINDING THAT PUBLIC CONYE~IENCE A~D NECESSITY REQUIRES THAT
THE DEFENDANT'S TRUCK LINE BE AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE AS A COMMON MOTOR CARRIER.
There is no substantial evidence to support the
change of service from a contract carrier to common
carrier ordered by the Commission.
The Commission's report as to statements which
are apparently intended to support the order of the
Commission are as follows:
"That for some time past, applicant has been
operating under contract carrier permit No. 26'6
and all supplements thereto, transporting motion
picture films, theatre accessories magazines and
periodicals from Salt Lake City to Lewiston and
Garland, Utah, over U. S. 91, Utah 101, Utah 163,
Utah 61, U. S. 191 and U.S. 30-S, serving the
theatres of the various towns enroute from Salt
Lake City to Lewiston and Garland, Utah.
That the Seamons Truck Line has been conducting continuous and satisfactory service as
a contract carrier under the jurisdiction of this
Commission, for the past 10 or 12 years.
That the evidence submitted at said hearing
establishes that public convenience and necessity
requires that applicant be authorized to operate
as a common motor carrier of: * * * '' (Rec. II, 15)
-

It therefore appears that the Commission made no
finding that the public desired or needed the change in
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type of service, but ~:mly states that the defendant had
rendered satisfactory service as a contract carrier for
a number of years. (The defendant had been the approved lessee for a little more than two years, or since
Apri115, 1947.)
Section 76-5-18, U.C.A., 1943, sets forth the following requirements for issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity to common carriers and provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any common motor
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate commerce within this state without first having obtained from the commission a certificate of convenience and necessity. * * * If the commission
finds from the evidence that the public convenience and necessity require the proposed service
or any part thereof it may issue the certificate
as prayed for, or issue it for the partial exercise
only of the privilege sought * * *. Otherwise
such certificate shall be denied.''
This court has construed this section in McCarthy,
et al vs. Public Service Commission, et al (184 P. 2d
220, 1947), which is a case very similar to the matter
before the court. In it some contract carriers sought
to change their services to common motor carriers, and
after quoting Section 76-5-18, U.C.A., 1943, as set out
above, Justice Pratt stated:
''To comply with the above quoted provision
the Public Service Commission must deny the
carrier-defendant's applications for certificates
of convenience and necessity unless presented
with evidence from which it could find that there
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is a public need for the services of a common carrier of sand and gravel, etc." (Ibid, 223)
In this McCarthy case (supra) the plaintiff was the
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company.
The defendants were eight trucking concerns which
sought to change from contract to common carrier service. The Public Service Commission issued them certificates of convenience and necessity to operate as common carriers of sand, gravel, cement, etc. The plaintiff
railroad also possessed a certificate of convenience and
necessity to operate as a common carrier of these commodities. There was a great deal of testimony showing
the need for the services of the eight truckers. These
aefendants, however, presented testimony at the hearing that they had no intention of changing the way ·
they carried on their business. All the public witnesses
whom these eight truckers served testified that they
were satisfied with the service rendered. There was no
evidence for a need to change from contract to common carrier service.
The Court wrote three opinions in setting aside the
orders of the Commission. Mr. Justice Wade wrote the
only dissent. The majority opinions are in agreement
that there must be evidence presented to the Commission of a need to change from contract to common carrier service before the Commission has p~wer to order
such a ch~ange.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Pratt on this subject
states:
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'' ... that despite the testimony of public wit.
nesses offered in support of the sand and grave]
truckers' applications there was no evidence of
a need to change these contract carriers into com.
mon carriers. (Ibid, 223)
And, the opinion concluded that'' The legislature has distinguished between
contract motor carriers and common motor car.
riers. When there is evidence which tends to
prove that the public need is for the service of
a common carrier, then the commission under
Sec. 76-518, UC.A, 1943 has the power to issue
certificates of convenience and necessity and not
until then. If the need is for contr,act carriers,
that is not a foundation for action such as was
taken by the commission in this case.'' (Italics
ours).
·
The opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe concurred in
the result reached by the court, and Mr~ ·Chief Justice
McDonough concurred in his opinion which found there
was no ·evidence that past services rendered as a con.
tract carrier had not been adequate and that there was
no evidence that the proposed common carrier services
would enhance the public.

1

~

''Indeed there is no evidence that the con.
venience or necessity of the public to have sand,
gravel and cement hauled will in any way be
better served by common carriers' service than
it has been in the past ten or twenty or more
years by contract carrier service. * * *
.As there is no sub~tantial evidence to sup·
port the decision of the commission that public
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convenience and necessity require the proposed
services that decision must be set aside." (Ibid,
224.)

There is even less evidence in the case before the
Court to support the finding of the Commission. The
defendant Hill presented no public witnesses to support
his application, and showed no need for changing his
service from a contract carrier to a common carrier.
The testimony of the defendant himself was to the
effect that there was no need as far as the public was
concerned for common carrier authority and that his
sole reason was that, in his opinion, operating as a common carrier would be to his personal advantage. (Rec.
I, 70-71).
In line with previous decisions on the matter of
public convenience and necessity, your Court will agree
that it is no.t the mere convenience of the defendantapplicant, but a genuine requirement that must be shown.
(Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245,
117 P. 2d 298; O'Keefe v. Chicago Railways Co., 354
ill. 645,188 N.E. 815.
The plaintiff knows it is the duty of the Commission to hear the evidence and adduce certain determinations and an order based upon the facts shown by such
evidence. However, the Commission is a limited creature of law and may not arbitrarily substitute its own
opinions, likes or dislikes for the evidence, or lack of
it, produced at a ~earing of an application. ''Public
convenience and necessity'' must be found, not private
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advantage to an isolated carrier. It is, of course, impossible to bring in all of the public at a hearing of this
kind, but the applicant at least has the duty to present
to the Commission some representative witnesses from
the public he proposes to serve to produce some substantial evidence to support his application.
C.

Plaintiff's Common Motor Carrier Application

VI.
THE FINDING OF THE COMMISSION THAT
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY DOES
NOT REQUIRE THE SERVICE PROPOSED TO BE
RENDERED BY THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The public witness appearing in behalf of the application of the Wycoff Company, Incorporated stated
that he was the manager of one of the twelve or thirteen
film distributing companies located in Salt Lake City
which serve all of the motion picture theaters in Utah,
Idaho, Montana, Wyoming and Nevada. (Rec. I, 124).
When asked whether it was true that the distributors
in Salt Lake all operate on substantially the same basis
he stated that they did and that he was familiar with all
of them (Rec. I, 131).
His testimony follows:
'' Q. Now, I ask you whether or not there
are occasions when you need the service of more
than one carrier into this north area?
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•·A. Yes: that has con1e up many a time,
due to the fact that "'\Yvroff I believe runs two
or three trips a day out· of here and Roy (Hill) I
believe operates one trip a day out of here.
'· Q. X ow, have yon had in emergencies had
to call upon "'\Yyroff to haul film for you?
•· ~-\... Several times; and we are very thankful we are able to call on him. Because if we
didn't have the service we would have missed
the theatre out entirely on their business.
"Q. That sen~ce has been rendered gratuitously, has it?
'• ~-\... Strictly gratuitous; no charge to us, no
charge to the exhibitor." (Rec. I, 126).
~Ir.

McMahon also testified that emergencies occur
in the film industry at irregular intervals varying from
two or three days in a row to a month or more (Rec.
I, 127), which requires an extra motor carrier service.
The testimony of ~L S. Wycoff is that these emergencies requiring additional service into the contemplated area is more than once a week. (Rec. I, 136)
This is the type of service contemplated by the application of plaintiff to serve the public as a common motor
carrier.
(Testimony of M. S. Wycoff, president of plaintiff
company):

'' Q. Now is it your desire to continue to deliver gratuitously in these emergencies, or do
you think that you should be authorized so you
can charge for it?
"A. We think that it has grown into such
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proportions now that we should be comp.ensated
for it.
'' Q. Do you feel there is a need for this additional service¥
A. There certainly is." (Rec. I, 136, 137).
''Commissioner Hacking: * * Assume for the
purpose of my question that the Commission
should grant you your common carrier application and also Roy Hill's application.
"A. Well, that would be entirely''Commissioner Hacking: Then, how would
this business of getting film be handled¥
"A. Roy (Hill), in my opinion, would continue to handle the bulk of the film up there,
probably all of it." (Rec. I, 168)
It is clearly the intention of the plaintiff to render
a service that the public needs and wants, and to be
compensated for it instead of being forced to render it
gratuitously in order to comply with the law. This
type of service requires common motor carrier authority
because the plaintiff has no possible way to choose
whom it will serve in cases of emergency, as a contract
carrier must do, and the public convenience and necessity requires that additional service should be available.
The fact that one representative of the film distributing companies testified on cross-examination that
the defendant Hill had never refused to make a special
trip for that witness (Rec. I, 132, 133) is not substantial
evidence on which to base the finding of the Commission,
because he had already indicated that the gratuitous
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emergency seiTices of the plaintiff had been used in
times of need when the defendant could not render the
service. (Previous testimony of Mr. McMahon, set
forth above).
VII.
THE FI~DIXGS OF THE CO~IMISSION THAT
THERE IS ALREADY SUFFICIENT SERVICE
AVAIL~WLE A~D THAT THE GRANTING OF A
CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY TO PLAINTIFF WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL
TO EXISTIXG TR~iNSPORTATION SERVICE AND
CONTRARY TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
PEOPLE I~ THE AREA, ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTAXTIAL EVIDENCE.
The evidence is uncontradicted that plaintiff desires
authority only to serve the public in times of emergency
when other carriers, because of limited schedules and
equipment, are physically unable to serve the public.
The effect of a "dark house" (i.e., a theatre without
motion picture film to show the public) is disastrous
both to the distributor of the film which is presented
with a claim for damages (Rec. I, 126, 127), and to the
theater itself which loses the good will of the community
it serves. The only public witness testified that there
was need of additional service by the plaintiff, that the
present service was not always adequate, and stated
that the plaintiff had several times saved his company
and the public from having a ''dark house.'' (Rec. I,
126).
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The plaintiff is already operating the necessary
equipment needed to serve the proposed area through
these communities in interstate commerce, transporting
motion picture films and related commodities, and also
in intrastate commerce, carrying other commodities as
a common carrier. This limited service proposed by the
plaintiff will be beneficial to everyone concerned - to
the defendant Hill whose limited equipment (2 trucks)
(Rec. II, 4) will not enable him to make special trips
when they are required by the industry; to the plaintiff
who should be compensated for its frequent hauls into
this area in times of emergency; and most of all, to the
public, for whose protection the Commission was established.
The Commission has adequate power to issue such
a limited certificate of convenience and necessity to
render service in times of emergency, etc. to adequately
protect ''existing transportation facilities'' and to foster
"the best interests of the people in the area" to be
served. The legislature gave the Commission ample
power and latitude to cope with this situation, as follows:
''If the commission finds from the evidence
that the public convenience and necessity require
the proposed service or any part thereof it may
issue the certificate as prayed for, or issue it for
the partial exercise only of the privilege sought,
and may attach to the exercise of the right
granted by such certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience
and necessity may require, otherwise such certificate shall be denied." (76-5-18, UCA 1943).
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CONCLUSION
The Public SeiTice Commission has acted improvidently in these cases by withholding the benefits of a
statutory contract carrier permit after granting the
plaintiff, \Yycoff Company, Incorporated such a permit
to ·serve the theatres in the Tremonton-Garland area.
The Commission has also made findings regarding public convenience and necessity which are not supported
by substantial evidence as is required by our law.
Plaintiff respectfully submits, therefore, that the
Court should enter its order directing that the Public
Service Commission of Utah grant to the plaintiff the
authority requested for service as a contract motor
carrier to the points in Tremonton and Garland, and
authority to establish emergency service proposed by
plaintiff's application for common carrier authority.
In addition plaintiff ·submits that the Court should
reverse the action of the Commisions in Case No. 3273
wherein common motor carrier service was authorized,
and direct that the Commission enter an order denying
such authority to the defendant Roy Hill.
Respectfully submitted,

WAYNE C. DURHAM,
215 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff
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